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Environmental issues have been growing in importance since the 70’s, especially after the 
Stockholm Summit in 1972. As a consequence of that, legal rules and institutions devoted to 
environment protection have been created in governments worldwide
1. Argentina is not an 
exception in that sense. In 1973, by decree 75 the first Secretary of Natural Resources and the 
Environment appeared within the Ministry of Economy and, since then, there has always been 
some agency of the sort at the federal government (it has been moved through the years from the 
Ministry of Economy to the Health Ministry, to the General Secretary of the Presidency, and since 
December 1999 to the Ministry of Social Development and the Environment). In the same line, a 
large body of legislation on the matter has been passed, including rules on every environmental 
media, on environmental impact analysis, etc. 
In that context, environmental regulation is generally justified by efficiency reasons since 
environmental problems are seen as a clear case of “market failure”. More precisely, pollution of 
any kind is considered a “negative externality” because some agent’s action harms others, who 
are not paid for that damage. There is no payment because environmental assets (as can be clean 
                                                 
* This note is a revised version of a shorter paper written in the context of a World Bank Project (BIRF 3958-
AR FOSIP: "Fortalecimiento al Sistema de Inversión Pública") at the request of Carola Pessino. I acknowledge 
the help with the data by Guillermo De Aduriz (Secretaría de Equidad Fiscal, Jefatura de Gabinete de Ministros, 
Argentina), Marcelo Castillo (Dirección Nacional de Inversión Pública, Ministerio de Economía, Argentina), 
and Pablo Palla (Universidad del CEMA). I also thank bibliographic references provided by Clare Breidenich 
and Maurice Lefranc at the United States Environmental Protection Agency, and by Billy Pizer from Resources 
for the Future.  
1 The environment has also become an important issue at the International Trade Organization (former GATT), 
while agreements as the European Community or NAFTA (and even the Mercosur –Mercado Común del Cono 
Sur-) have also included environmental provisions.  
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air or clean water) are not exchanged in any market. Since “market failures” are one of the 
reasons that may justify public intervention
2, environmental public policy can be seen on the same 
level as health protection or basic education policies (the importance of State’s role for 
environmental protection with respect to other functions can be assessed in Table 1).  
 
Table 1: Functions of the State 






Providing pure public goods: 
Defense, Law and Order, Property Rights, Macroeconomic 











E En nv vi ir ro on nm me en nt ta al l   




















Coordinating Private Activity: 




Source: Reproduction of Figure 1.1. from the World Development Report (WB, 1997). 
 
 
In general, environmental public policies are directed towards correcting market failures in 
such a way that agents incorporate the environmental costs of their actions. Less emphasis is put 
on equity considerations, and this is a phenomenon valid for all countries not only for developing 
ones. Nevertheless, it can be argued that equity aspects of environmental policies are as least as 
important as efficiency ones. For example, the State should be avoiding location of all most toxic 
firms or toxic waste deposits closer to poorer neighborhoods.  
                                                 
2 Even when “market failures” justify a priori government’s intervention, it is always relevant to remember that 
 be created when correcting the former. So, both types of deficiencies have 
to be weighted in order to confirm that environmental public policy is welfare improving.   
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But, while in a way or another, everybody recognizes the need of public environmental 
expenditures because of the above mentioned reasons, when it comes to macroeconomic 
adjustment that type of spending is generally very vulnerable to being cut. In that sense, Argentina 
is not an exception either. In fact, the last expenditure cut to reduce in fiscal deficit in 1999 (a 
reduction in public outlays of around 1,000 millions pesos), implied a decrease of which 66.5 
millions from the former Secretary of Natural Resources and Sustainable Development.  
 So, given efficiency, equity and fiscal austerity reasons, it is crucial to identify what would 
be an “optimum” absolute amount of public environmental expenditures, and how those should be 
spent. In particular, priorities have to be set, so that public resources (which are limited) are 
channeled in the most efficient and more equitable way to protect human health and the 
environment. In any case, what is clear is that such analysis requires a comparison of marginal 
costs of reducing pollution and marginal benefits of doings so. Then, an analysis of "pollution 
abatement and control" expenditures is key to deal with the first part of that equation, and so, a 
crucial element in any rational effort to set or evaluate environmental policy. 
Almost nothing is known in terms of private environmental costs in Argentina. There have 
been some isolated surveys on the matter but there is no coherent aggregate information. On the 
side of public expenditure, there were no studies performed to analyze this issue but budgetary 
data do exist. In this context, the purpose of this note is to be a first approach on what has been 
done (both quantitatively and qualitatively) in t erms of public environmental expenditure in 
Argentina during the 90s and what are the issues still pending. In particular, section I evaluates 
how much has been spent in environmental problems with in comparison to other countries and 
with respect to other programs. Then, section II makes an analysis of how were public 
expenditure monies spent, with emphasis on three aspects: the design of environmental federalism, 
the type of regulation used to protect the environment, and the cost-benefit analysis performed.  
I.  Quantitative Analysis  
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A complete quantification of environmental expenditures requires accounting for all 
spending directed to achieve environmental objectives. In general, there are different kinds of 
classifications for overall “pollution abatement and control” expenditures (usually denominated 
PACE): a) by type or environmental media (air, water, waste, noise, etc.), b) by economic 
sector (households, businesses or public sector) and c) by type of expenditure (investment or 
current expenditures
3). 
There is no compiled information for overall private or public environmental expenditures 
for Argentina. There are some spread data on environmental investments by large industrial firms 
in Chudnovsky et al. (1997) and investment environmental expenses by different types of firms in 
ADEGA (1995). Meaning by "spread" that, they are based on small surveys at a point in time. 
For example, Chudnovsky et al (1997) reports environmental investments for the period 1993-
1997 based on 7 to 22 industrial firms that answered a survey run by them. Information on public 
environmental expenditures has never been explicitly published but it can at least be derived from 
budgets, while private costs information is not of easy access. This is the reason why this article 
focuses on public environmental expenditures rather than private ones. 
Now, in terms of quantifying public environmental expenditures, it is important to first of all 
sort by economic sector to assess, not the country total effort to prevent and abate pollution (e.g., 
purchases of motor vehicles devices as catalytic converters by households or development of 
pollution prevention technologies by firms), but rather government expenses directed at 
preventing, reducing and eliminating pollution or nuisances arising as a residual of consumption and 
production patterns
4.  
According to the extent of public sector participation in the economy, public PACE can 
contain a large share of governments own abatement expenses (e.g., to run public sewer systems) 
                                                 
3 In fact, following OECD (1996), to account for PACE according to the Abater Principle one has to add to 
investment and current expenditures, receipts from by-products of pollution control and abatement activity. 
Furthermore, accounting for PACE according to the Financing Principle implies adding to the latter Subsidies 
to the private sector, and subtracting Fees and/or Charges from the private sector. However, in most countries, 
PACE are calculated according to the Abater Principle.  
4 PACE´s definition excludes any expenditure on natural resources management (e.g., protection of endangered  
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and may be large amounts of research and development expenses, or they can involve mostly 
regulation and monitoring costs. Public PACE distribution by environmental media would depend 
on countries natural characteristics and structure of production (i.e., it would include mostly air 
and noise pollution if there are more urban than rural areas). 
 
Table 2. Expenditures for Pollution Abatement and
              Control in Selected Countries
Country Year Public Total
(% of GDP) (% of GDP)
Australia 1991 0.5 0.9










Netherlands 1992 1.2 2
Portugal 1992 0.8
Russian Federation* 1994 0.9
Slovak Republic* 1994 1.7
Spain 1991 0.6
Sweden 1991 0.8
Switzerland 1992 1.0 2.1
United Kingdom 1990 0.4 1.5
United States 1992 0.7 1.7
Average 0.7 1.5
Source: from Summary Table 1 in OECD (1996).
Note: * are non-OECD countries, while the rest belong to OECD.  
 
In general, only a small fraction of countries' budgets is devoted to the environment, and 
this is particularly true in developing countries. To assess how “small” is the amount spent, it is 
useful to review what fraction of public monies is devoted to the environment in other countries, 
and how much is spent in other activities carried out by the government which also involve the 
                                                 
 
species or natural parks).  
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“solution” of externalities (principally, Basic Education) or minimal functions of the State (as 
Justice, Defense and Security and Public Health). 
 
Table 3. Expenditures for Pollution Abatement and Control by Sector and 
               by Type in the United States
Air Water  Solid Waste Total** Total**
(Millions of Dollars) (%)
Pollution Abatement 36,167 41,550 41,080 117,622 96.6 100
Personal Consumption 9,756 9,756 8.3
Business 24,800 14,802 26,147 64,017 54.4
Government*** 1,611 26,748 14,933 43,848 37.3 100
· Federal 812 26,276 487 27,943 63.7
· State and Local 799 472 14,446 15,906 36.3
Regulation and Monitoring 714 622 429 2,201 1.8
· Federal Government 234 440 194 1,271
· State and Local Governments 480 182 234 930
Research and Development 716 212 228 1,989 1.6 100
Private 420 76 82 685 34.4
Government 296 136 146 1,304 65.6 100
· Federal 280 91 128 1,220 93.6
· State and Local 16 45 18 84 6.4
Total PACE 37,597 42,384 41,737 121,812 100
(% of GDP) 1.75
Total Government Spending 2,621 27,506 15,508 47,353
(% of PACE) 38.9
(% of GDP) 0.7
Federal Government Spending 1,326 26,807 809 30,434
(% of PACE) 25.0
(% of GDP) 0.4
Note: * Information referred to 1994, the last year of the Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditure Survey (BEA, 1996).
       ** Total includes other expenditures as control of noise, radiation and pesticide pollution.
    ***  It includes operating costs and capital expenditures for the public sewer system.  
 
In that sense, Table 2 shows that approximately 1.5% of GDP is devoted to PACE 
(OECD, 1996), while considering only public expenditure, that percentage decreases to 0.7%. 
And, Table 3 shows details of the United States percentages by classifying expenditures by each 
environmental media (air, water and solid waste), by sector (personal consumption, businesses, 
and government), a nd by spending types (in this case: pollution abatement, regulation and  
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monitoring, and research and environment)
5. Given these international references, what are those 
figures for Argentina?  
The only way to build a figure for public PACE in Argentina is to account for budget 
spending by all agencies that have a role to play in policies to protect the environment at all levels 
of government. This should include at the federal level not only the specific Secretary of the 
Environment
6 but also Secretaries of the Ministry of Finance (e.g., those related to Energy, 
Industry, Mining, Agriculture, etc.), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (e.g., related to international 
environmental negotiations), Ministry of Culture and Education (e.g., related to Science and 
Technology), etc
7. In addition, environmental agencies of local governments have to be 
considered. A lower bound number could come from considering provinces which have the most 
actives environmental policies:  Córdoba, Santa Fe, Mendoza, Buenos Aires, and, the City of 
Buenos Aires.  
However, for Argentina, and as a consequence of difficulties to access to the data, the 
most feasible comparison comes from contrasting not overall public expenditures but what is spent 
by the Argentinean National Environmental Authority (SRNyAH, SRNyDS, or SDSyPA 
depending on the year we talk about). That agency was in the 90s the parallel of the EPA 
(Environmental Protection Agency) in the U.S., and so it can be compared to the latter once one 
takes care for their different roles
8. EPA has a relatively stable budget of around 7,000 million 
                                                 
5 In the United States, the Bureau of the Census had collected data of a PACE Survey from 1972 to 1994 (see 
BEA, 1996), when it was cut for budgetary reasons. However, that survey will be reinstated in 2000 (for a 
discussion of changes to the original survey that are being discussed see Burtraw Dallas, Alan Krupnick, 
Richard Morgenstern, William Pizer and Jhih-Shyang Shih, 2000).  
6 This secretary was called Secretaría de Recursos Naturales y Ambiente Humano (SRNyAH) until 1996, 
Secretaría de Recursos Naturales y Desarrollo Sostenible (SRNyDS) from 1996 to 1999, and Secretaría de 
Desarrollo Sustentable y Política Ambiental (SDSyPA) since December 1999. 
7 There is a former Secretaría de Recursos Naturales y Desarrollo Sustentable (SRNyDS) internal document 
which reports all areas of the federal government which had some role to play in the protection of the 
environment by 1997 (“Situación Normativa de Competencias en Materia Ambiental en el  mbito de la 
Administración Pública Nacional”). However, this situation is now outdated since after the new administration 
assumed in December 1999, it modified the public sector organization structure. In fact, only part of the 
functions of the former SRNyDS belong now to the Secretaría de Desarrrollo Sustentable y Política Ambiental. 
8 In terms of structure, comparisons with the EPA are a priori somehow reasonable since the United States 
have also a federal structure.   
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dollars, which represents approximately 0.4% of U.S. federal outlays and roughly 0.1% of U.S. 
GDP (www.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/).  
In the case of Argentina, figures are as in Table 4. It is indisputable then that, until 1998, if 
EPA and this Argentinean National Environmental Authority had the same type of functions and 
attained the same goals, public environmental expenditures in Argentina would be lower. Figures 
became closer for 1998, when the SRNyDS was assigned approximately 180 million pesos 
together with water regulations functions which corresponded to the Ministry of Economy and the 
Ministry of the Interior (decree 146/98). Those are issues that the EPA also controls, which 
makes 1998 a better year for comparison than previous ones. However, even under those 
circumstances, EPA expenditures are higher than those corresponding the Argentinean National 
Environmental Authority. 
 
Table 4. Public Expenditures for Argentina’s National Environmental Agency 






- Millions of Current 
Pesos*- 
- Millions of 
Current Pesos*- 
- As % of Federal 
Public Expend. - 
-As % of GDP- 
1994  62.00  50.86  0.12  0.02 
1995  58.39  45.33  0.10  0.02 
1996  49.86  51.98  0.12  0.02 
1997  66.35  59.55  0.13  0.02 
1998**  257.10  172.27  0.36  0.05 
1999  408.24  101.71  0.21  0.04 
Source: Official Budgets  1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999. Information for 1990, 1991 and 1992 was not  
available from official sources, and information for 1993 was incomplete. 
Note: * The exchange rate between pesos and dollars is one to one. 
** There was a transfer of all functions related to water issues from the Ministry of Finance to the SRNyDS   
(Decree 146/98) due to a conflict with the privatized water company for the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area. 
 
 
As stated above, another measure of comparison to evaluate how “small” are 
environmental expenditures in Argentina´s budget is comparing environmental outlays to other 
expenditures towards minimal functions of the State and intermediate functions (specifically to  
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correct real externalities) to see if “the presumed lag” is the same as in other areas. Table 5 shows 
such a comparison between the U.S. and Argentina. As a simple conjecture, it seems there is not 
lag with respect to the fraction destined to Environmental Protection in the U.S: than in Argentina 
contrasting with other areas as Public Health or Basic Education. 
Having made a short quantitative analysis, it is important to remember that beyond data 
restrictions which make quantitative analysis of public PACE quite difficult, even if that kind of 
information was available, comparisons among countries have some caveats that merit to be 
considered. It is true as it was stressed above that they are only valid if governments have to fulfill 
the same environmental functions (note that a similar distribution of functions among levels of 
governments has to hold), and the same goals are attained with the same amount of spending. But, 
there are also some other features to consider when evaluating the absolute amount of public 
PACE. 
 
Table 5. Comparison of Federal Outlays Directed Towards Minimal and  
Intermediate Functions of the State between the U.S. and Argentina for 1998 
 
  United States  Argentina  United 
States 
Argentina 
  -as % of Federal Expenditures--  -as % of GDP- 
Functions         
Justice 









Public Health  7.9  1.8  1.5  0.3 
Education  3.3  4.5  0.6  0.6 
Environmental Protection*  1.3  1.1  0.3  0.2 
Source: Own calculations according to www.access.gpo.gov/usbudget/fy2000/guide02.html and Dirección Nacional de 
Programación del Gasto Social (1999). 
Note: * In the case of the U.S., it includes t he amount budgeted for Natural Resources and the 
Environment. In the case of Argentina, information is calculated by making quite an assumption: the ratio 
expenditure from EPA and from the rest of U.S. federal government agencies that are involved in the 




First of all, an argument for “small” public environmental expenditures may be the own 
dynamic of the private sector towards the environment. This appear to be the case particularly in 
developing countries (see López Murphy and Conte Grand, 1998). In Argentina, for example, 
firms´ environmental management has been acquiring importance not as the product of stronger 
government intervention but rather as a result of international markets requirements. In fact, 
according to Chudnovsky et al (1996), in Argentina, the greatest efforts appear to be focused on 
the steel and petrochemical sectors, and they are stronger the larger and more oriented towards 
international markets are the firms (different is the issue of small and medium size companies)
9. 
From that point of view, a low level of public environmental intervention in a developing country 
would not necessarily mean a worse environment since it might free-ride on stronger 
environmental regulations (and public expenditures) in developed countries. 
Another reason which would make public PACE comparisons less relevant is that while 
public environmental expenditures may be large (and seen as a “good indication” of environment’s 
s direct) ways of not taking care of the environment: 
perverse subsidies (e.g. fuel subsidies in the transportation sector or fertilizers subsidies in the 
agricultural sector). Eliminating them could show that governments can guarantee a better 
environment with lower expenditures (as an illustration of this, see work by de Moor 1997 and 
Gandhi 1996). In that sense, quantifying public expenditures per se is a trivial exercise. 
 
II.  Qualitative Analysis  
 
So, the other dimension of public environmental expenditure is a qualification of how the 
assigned budget is spent. While there is plenty information on how EPA spend its budget and what 
are its goals by environmental media and by specific program (e.g., in 1999, 76 million dollars are 
enacted to attain Ozone and Particulate Matter Air Pollution Standards, 17 millions for Climate 
                                                 
9 A similar analysis with emphasis on different sectors was carried out by Fundación de Investigaciones 
Latinoamericanas (FIEL, 1996).  
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Change, etc.), this is not the case for the SRNyDS. Expenditures as they are classified by 
program simply replicate outlays by each one of the Under Secretaries which formed the structure 
of the Secretariat. For example, for 1998, there are only 5 categories: 1.  Central Activities, 16. 
Sustainable Development of Natural Resource, 17. Water Issues, 18. Environmental Issues, and 
99. Contribution to Decentralized Agencies dependent of the SRNyDS (e.g., National Parks 
Agency, regulation agency for water in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area –Ente Tripartito de 
Obras y Servicios Sanitarios or ETOSS-, etc.).  
There is another, presumably more detailed classification by “Activity and Works” but is 
rather disordered since it does make some aggregation by activity but not following a criterion as 
amount spent by environmental media or by main goals of the SRNyDS (see Table 6 as an 
example for 1998).  
Nevertheless, a positive point on that matter is that it has been improving, since, when 
looking at previous budgets, only a few categories of “Activities and Works” were reported, 
making even more difficult to disentangle how were public monies spent. In addition, accounting of 
expenditures by use, source of funds, and geographic distribution has also been improving in the 
last few years. For example, table 7 shows how “Figurative” expenditures and “Not Classified” 
expenditures have been decreasing. 
It is clear then from this section that few things are known on how much Argentina spends 
on environmental protection, neither in the private sector nor in the public sector. Nevertheless, 
even if more information were available, a complete evaluation would require looking at how are 
those resources directed. In that sense, it is crucial to have at least some knowledge on the role 
played by each level of government in the design and monitoring of environmental regulation, what 
kind of rules are in place to prevent any “excessive” environmental harm, and what kind of cost-




Table 6. Classification of Expenditures of the SRNyDS by
               "Activity and Works"
Classif. Codes* Public Environmental Expenditures of the SRNyDS
0/0/1/0 Administration
Support for Hydraulic Works
Contribution to the Secretaría General de la Presidencia de la Nación
0/1/1/0 Environmental Matanza-Riachuelo Plan (IDB PPF 946)




0/0/3/0 Contribution to the National Institute of Water and Environment
Fire Handling
Preservation and Protection of Water Resources
0/0/4/0 Contributions to the National Treasury
Pollution Management 
Improvement and Creation of Protected Natural Forest and Biodiversity
0/0/5/0 Management of Water Resources
Contributions to the Ente Nac. de Obras Hídricas y Saneamiento
Development of Institutional Relations
Strengthening Participation in Environmental Management
Pollution Management 
0/0/6/0 Institutional Environmental Development (IDB 767-OC)
Strengthening Participation in Environmental Management
Reforming Waterworks and Sanitation Sectors
0/0/7/0 Institutional Environmental Development (IDB 907-SF)
0/0/8/0 Transference for the Ex Fund for Regional Development
0/0/9/0 External Financing and Cooperation (IDB 552/OC-AR)
0/1/0/0 Others
0/1/0/51,0/1/0/52,0/1/0/53,0/5/0/52,0/1/0/54,0/7/0/55,0/2/0/96: Not specified
Source: Initial Budget for Fiscal Year 1998






Table 7. Public Environmental Expenditures in Argentina
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Code Classification (as percentage of total expenditures)
By use (inciso)
1 Personal Services 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.08
2 Consumption goods 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
3 No Personal Services 0.23 0.14 0.26 0.31 0.13 0.24
4 Use Goods 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.26 0.39
5 Transfers 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.25 0.28
9 "Figurative" Expenditures 0.63 0.67 0.54 0.51 0.32 0.00
By source
1.1 National Treasury 0.99 0.93 0.80 0.75 0.86 0.78
1.3 Resources with specific destination 0.01 0.08 0.11 0.01 0.01
1.4 Internal Transfers 0.05 0.05
1.5 Internal Credit 0.02 0.07
2.1 External Transfers 0.01 0.01
2.2 External Credits 0.01 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.05 0.08
By region
2 Capital Federal 1.00 0.33 0.45 0.47 0.22 0.37
6 Buenos Aires 0.07
Other Provinces 0.01 0.19 0.24
96 InterProvinces 0.18 0.36
97 Federal 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.03
99 Not Classified 0.67 0.54 0.51 0.32
Source: Official budgets  
 
 
1)  Environmental Federalism in Argentina 
 
An unambiguous division of responsibilities among federal and local governments is key 
for a coherent environmental policy. Arguments which favor decentralization are known and are 
centered basically on the following reasons: that people in each region may have different tastes 
toward the environment; that abatement costs can be quite distinct in a place than in another; that 
the assimilative capacity of the environment changes according to each site; that local regulators 
have more incentives to take care of the environment because they suffer a greater political 
pressure to solve concrete problems; or that regional agencies have a better knowledge on their  
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regions´ environmental problems.  
On the other side, those who propitiate federal environmental regulations do so: because 
of interjurisdictional problems (for example pollution of rivers that cross  -or are the border 
among- several states or air pollution, which may be underprotected if left to local governments 
because of free-rider effect); to avoid a “race-to-the-bottom” if state’s governments attempt to 
lower their environmental standards to attract investments
10; to avoid duplication costs for firms 
which have activities in several jurisdictions; because of economies of scale in the design and 
enforcement of regulations, and (on equity considerations) to guarantee a minimum level of 
environmental quality for all inhabitants.  
In general, however, countries have mixed regimes with some functions taken care by 
federal governments and some others by local ones, while both levels share some other tasks
11. In 
Argentina, by the Constitution of 1853 local governments had all the power over their natural 
resources and their environment since they had not explicitly delegated it to the federal government 
(art. 104). This was not enough to avoid rulemaking by national government using as a justification 
that the Congress could pass laws for the general welfare of all provinces (art. 67 inc. 16). Then, a 
mechanism of “leyes convenio” was put in place as a consequence of such a vague definition of 
each level of government rights. That mechanism consists in dictating a national law and then seeks 
its approval at the local level. But, since Provinces had the right to adhere or not, the consequence 
was the existence of multiple regulations on the same resource. Two examples can illustrate this 
point: air quality rules and hazardous waste legislation.  
Difficulties in rule making with respect to air quality standards are particularly acute for the 
Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area. Table 8 portrays that situation by reporting the different 
standards existing for each level of government. In particular, it compares Carbon Monoxide, 
Nitrogen Oxides, Sulfur Dioxide, Ozone, Total Suspended Particulates, and Lead for the City of 
                                                 
10 In some cases, it is also argued that centralization is necessary to avoid “race-to-the-top” (particularly for 
policies directed to toxic wastes). Local governments generally do not want to receive them and so establish 
stricter standards or higher taxes (this is also known as NYMBY or “Not in my backyard” regulations).  
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Buenos Aires (ordenanza 39.025 of 1983), for the Province of Buenos Aires (law 11.459 of 
1993), and for all the Nation (law 20.284 of 1973).  
 
Table 8. Comparison of Argentine Air Quality Standards 
 
Units: - m mg/m
3-  Capital 
Federal* 




Carbon Monoxide       
20 minutes  15,000     
1 hour    40,100  57,300 
8 hours    10,300  11,400 
24 hours  3,000     
Nitrogen Oxides       
20 minutes  400     
1hour    376  847 
24 hours  100    282 
1 year    100   
Sulfur Dioxides       
20 minutes  500     
1 hour      2,620 
3 hours    1,310   
8 hours      780 
24 hours  80  370   
1month      80 
1 year    80   
Ozone       
20 minutes  100     
1 hour    235  200 
8 hours       
24 hours  30     
Total Suspended Particulates       
20 minutes  500     
24 hours  150     
1 month      150 
Lead       
20 minutes  10     
24 hours  1     
3 months    1.5   
Source: Weaver and Balán (1998). 
Note: Capital Federal is the City of Buenos Aires. 
 
As expected because of urban pollution, standards are in several cases (as for Carbon 
                                                 
 
11 A typical example of the latter is air pollution regulation in the United States, where minimum standards are  
16  
Monoxide and Nitrogen Oxides) more strict at the local level than those of the federal 
government. However, for Ozone 1 hour, for example, table 8 shows that the Province of Buenos 
Aires standard is less strict than the national one. Another strange issue is why Sulfur Dioxides 24 
hrs. standard is so different for the City of Buenos Aires than for the Province, despite of the fact 
that the air "circulates" freely throughout the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires. 
The hazardous waste legislation is another example of environmental federalism difficulties. 
In the management of “hazardous waste” there is a national law (law 24.051 of 1991), which 
some provinces have adopted
12. This is not the case for the Province of Buenos Aires, which has 
its own legislation on “special wastes” (law 11.720 of 1995). As a consequence of that, in order 
to "coordinate" this problem, the Secretary of Environmental Policy (SPA) of the Buenos Aires 
Province and the former SRNyDS have signed a compromise according to which the SRNyDS 
recognizes the province jurisdiction over hazardous waste except in those cases which are explicit 
in the national law 24.051 (those are exactly the ones recommended by economic theory: 
interjurisdictional problems, situations with risks of “race-to-the-bottom”, etc) and accept to 
eliminate from the National Register of Transporters, Producers and Operators of Hazardous 
Waste those firms which operate in the province
13 (Conte Grand, 1999).  
However, while the latter does not seem to be much a "solution" in terms of coordination, 
there is a more vivid illustration of the rather inefficient division of responsibilities in the area of 
hazardous waste. Since they reformed their Constitution, both the Province of Buenos Aires and 
the Capital Federal have forbidden the entry of hazardous waste to their territory. However, the 
Capital (which is surrounded by the Province) does not have treatment plants, so, waste has to be 
transported by national roads to further provinces (basically Santa Fe and Córdoba) instead of to 
the Province of Buenos Aires, increasing unnecessarily treatment costs and the potential risk of 
                                                 
 
set at the federal level and states can make them more (no less) strict if they desire. 
12 In fact, of the 23 Argentine Provinces, 11 have taken as their own the national law, 8 have legislation which 
are quite similar to law 24.051, 2 have their own regulations and 2 others do not have any regulation on 
hazardous waste. 
13 In exchange for that, the SPA agrees to transfer to the national government 10% of the fix fee they charge.  
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accidents. 
The 1994 reform of the National Constitution of 1994, as a way to find a solution to all 
these situations, established “minimum standards” of environmental quality for the overall country 
(art. 41), while allowing provinces to set their own regulation to guarantee stricter (not lower) 
standards. However, more than six years after the reform of t he National Constitution, no 
“minimum standards” has been approved
14. At this point it is clear that a decision has to be made 
if the goal is to spend public funds in a more efficient way by solving the actual chaos produced by 
superposed laws. A choice has to be made between decentralization clearly defined or shared 
responsibility with “minimum standards” established at the national level (with stricter local 
regulation) as was established by the 1994 Constitution. 
  
2)  Type of Environmental Regulations in Argentina 
 
In its beginnings environmental regulation in all countries was based on “command and 
control” (CAC) rules, which establish a certain behavior for polluters that regulators try to 
enforce. Examples of CAC regulations are basically: standards of environmental quality (specify 
the maximum amounts of pollution accumulated on the environment), emission standards (set the 
maximum amount of emissions authorized), technology standards (establish the type of technology 
allowed for some polluting process), product standards (fix the characteristics that must have 
some potentially polluting goods), and input standards (define the type of inputs to be used or 
determine the maximum to be utilized of some polluting inputs)
15.  
The attraction of this type of instrument is that at least theoretically environmental 
authorities have control over the amount of allowed emissions and can decide which are the 
sectors that have to improve. However, in practice, that kind of regulation has at least three type 
                                                 
14 There are several projects of the sort in the Congress but none has been passed. 
15 Purely administrative regulations as prohibition for cars to circulate a certain number of days during the 
week (as in Santiago de Chile, Mexico D.F. or even Paris for emergency days) or to go downtown during peak 
hours are also examples of CAC rules.  
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of weaknesses: it requires to have a large amount of information (on technology costs and on 
pollution damages to be able to set the optimum standard, and of monitoring to control that the 
standard is implemented), it does not give incentives to innovation (once standards are attained no 
firm attempts to improve over that), and, it creates possibilities of lobbying by firms (since 
standards are generally different by sector).  
Then, more recently, as in other fields of regulation, environmental policies have been 
redirected towards more “incentive” or “market-oriented” rules as a way of being more cost-
effective. Instruments of this type are principally: direct or indirect emission taxes (includes taxing 
emissions directly, taxing polluting goods or polluting inputs), subsidies, deposit/refund systems, 
tradable permits, and establishment of legal responsibility. Another “market-based” scheme is 
regulators´ information disclosure on polluters’ activities, which is known as the “third wave” of 
environmental regulation and whose main advantage is the transfer of most of monitoring tasks 
from the government to the community.  
In terms of environmental regulation, the case of Argentina is not so different from other 
countries. In fact, regulations on the environment are more than abundant. There are rules for air 
and water that establish environmental quality and emission standards. For example, the above 
mentioned law 20.284 that fixes standards for air quality or the decree 875 which sets limits to 
emissions by mobile sources.  In a similar way, law 20.324 and several decrees determines 
maximum pollution amounts for industrial discharges. There is also legislation on technological 
standards as the already mentioned on hazardous waste (law 24.051) that regulates treatment, 
disposal and storage plants (TDSs).  
There also are some shy cases of taxes and subsidies: law 24.196, which determines that 
expenditures toward pollution prevention in mining can be deduced from income taxes, law 
23.966 that established a differential tax on leaded gasoline as a way of phasing out lead; or the 
concession contract of water provision to a private firm in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area 
(art. 4.9.2 and 11.6.2) that establishes the possibility of billing industrial firms if their discharges 
contain amounts of pollution above standards.  Other examples of the use of this type of policies 
are a system of subsidies for conversion of taxis to GNC, also (in some way) the fee on hazardous  
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waste which is related to the amount generated waste, use of fossil fuels and water, and amount of 
waste recycled (law 24.051), and financing of small and medium firms to obtain ISO 14000 
certifications.  
In terms of deposit/refund schemes, while official rules do not exist, some private firms 
have implemented them for plastic or glass bottles. Argentina as most other countries (except the 
U.S. and some other isolated experiences in Germany, Australia, Canada and recently in Chile
16) 
does not have any tradable permit system. With respect to the establishment of liability rules, the 
law 24.051 of hazardous waste sets a strict liability without defense for “double” contributory 
negligence (i.e., the only way not no be sanctioned is to prove that any accident was somebody’s 
else fault, and, one has taken due care).  
Finally, there are some isolated experiences of disclosure of information of the positive 
type (i.e., on voluntary agreements to reduce pollution). In that sense, the most cited case is the 
agreement among petroleum companies, local and federal governments to implement an 
environmental management plan to reduce water pollution on the Colorado River. Nevertheless, 
despite of the trend toward more pollution measurement, there are no schemes of “negative 
information dissemination” (as the Toxic Release Inventory in the 
Evaluation and Rating” program in Indonesia
17) in Argentina. There are some data on air pollution 
collected by Fundación Siglo XXI (Carbon Monoxide downtown), by the City of Buenos Aires 
Laboratorio de Vigilancia Atmosférica, Instituto de Seguridad y Educación Vial (ISEV) and 
Instituto Pro Buenos Aires, and by the PROAIRE Program in the City of Córdoba
18. For water, 
the private firm that has the concession of the Water Company for Buenos Aires has made several 
monitoring campaigns. The same is true for hazardous waste. There is a Register for Generators, 
Transporters and TSDs under law 24.051 but nobody (except for some federal government 
officials) can have access to it. Free access to environmental data is the exception rather than the 
rule. 
                                                 
16 In that respect, see OECD (1994) and for Chile: the Decree 4/92 of the Ministry of Health. 
17A rather complete reference for that type of programs is World Bank (2000).  
20  
 
3) Cost-Benefit Analysis 
 
Finally, as important as going towards more flexible regulations in order to save costs, is 
to take care of weighting costs and benefits at the moment of initiating any project or when 
deciding over a regulation. There are several laws in Argentina that set rules for project evaluation 
with environmental considerations. In fact, the procedure for environmental impact analysis (EIA) 
is inspired mostly on U.S., E.U. and international organization standards.  
At the f ederal level, the National System of Public Investment has a “General 
Environmental Guide” to evaluate all projects (law 24.354 and resolution 501 by SRNDS). On a 
more specific level, there are norms on ElA for hazardous waste (decree 831 by SRNyDS), for 
mining (law 24.585), for large dams (law 23.879), as well as several guides for specific EIAs for 
hydraulic works, projects in national parks, etc., and most Argentinean provinces also have their 
own EIA laws (see Iribarren, 1997). However, while there is a tendency towards sanctioning EIA 
studies for private and public sector projects, it is generally limited to physical assessment of 
damage, not an economic valuation of benefit and cost involved. In addition, there is just nothing 
for regulations per se. Water or air pollution standards are not defined by studying the local 
conditions, but copying U.S. or E.U. ones. The most recent case of this type is law 5.965 and 
decree 3.395 of the Buenos Aires Province that directly refers to NAAQS EPA standards.  
The  only exceptions are punctual studies in the framework of Inter American 
Development Bank (IDB), World Bank (WB) or U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
projects. There was an attempt of contingent valuation and an hedonic pricing valuation to 
measure willingness to pay to reduce flood risk under a project financed by the IDB and a survey 
by the Consejo Federal de Agua Potable y Saneamiento to quantify willingness to pay for sewers 
at the Matanza-Riachuelo Rivers (World Bank, 1995). Then, under a World Bank project there 
was a study of "avoided health" costs of reducing air pollution in the Buenos Aires Metropolitan 
                                                 
 
18 There are also measurements for the city of Mendoza and the Province of Buenos Aires.  
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Area (Conte Grand, 1998). In terms of costs quantification, under a project financed by EPA to 
determine Argentina’s climate change target, private costs of alternative greenhouse gases 
mitigation measures were approximated (SRNyDS, 1999).  So, while there are isolated efforts to 
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